Traditions

Episode #47 - Eubanks on Automating Inequality

 In this episode I talk to Virginia Eubanks. Virginia is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany, SUNY. She is the author of several books, including Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor and Digital Dead End: Fighting for Social Justice in the Information Age. Her writing about technology and social justice has appeared in The American Prospect, The Nation, Harper’s and Wired. She has worked for two decades in community technology and economic justice movements. We talk about the history of poverty management in the US and how it is now being infiltrated and affected by tools for algorithmic governance. You can download the episode here or listen below. You can also subscribe to the show on iTunes or Stitcher (the RSS feed is here). Show Notes0:00 - Introduction1:39 - The future is unevenly distributed but not in the way you might think7:05 - Virginia's personal encounter with the tools for automating inequality12:33 - Automated helplessness?14:11 - The history of poverty management: denial and moralisation22:40 - Technology doesn't disrupt our ideology of poverty; it amplifies it24:16 - The problem of poverty myths: it's not just something that happens to other people28:23 - The Indiana Case Study: Automating the system for claiming benefits33:15 - The problem of automated defaults in the Indiana Case37:32 - What happened in the end?41:38 - The L.A. Case Study: A "match.com" for the homeless45:40 - The Allegheny County Case Study: Managing At-Risk Children52:46 - Doing the right things... -

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Burke's Prejudice

Perhaps a little Burke to balance all that Enlightenment individualism. The term ‘prejudice’ is being used ironically. Burke considers the slow accretion of many moments of of widely distributed wisdom to be the bank of ‘prejudice’ that we draw on.You see, Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess that we are generally men of untaught feelings: that, instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree; and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted, and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private... -

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MEMORIES

I just watched the third in my series of video lectures on Ideological Critique as a refresher for a forthcoming lecture on Mannheim in my Columbia course.  I watched my discourse on Mannheim’s ideological analysis of time consciousness, and then my attempt at an extension of it to the case... -

Read More @ The Philosopher’s Stone
Materiality revisited

I’ve long been puzzled by materiality. ¶ Here’s a thought: What if materiality isn’t characterized by anything deeply metaphysical, but by a physical quality? Perhaps to be material just is to have something like inertia, or mass, or energy? ¶ (I think that to have zero of some quality... -

Read More @ Alexander Pruss

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Burke's Prejudice Perhaps a little Burke to balance all that Enlightenment individualism. The term ‘prejudice’ is being used ironically. Burke considers the slow accretion of many moments of of widely distributed wisdom to be the bank of ‘prejudice’ that we draw on.You see, Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess that we are generally men of untaught feelings: that, instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a... Ombhurbhuva -


Yoko Ono at Mori Art Museum If you're in Tokyo (lucky you!) and you happen to be in or near Roppongi, do stop by the art museum to witness their very creative and thoughtful exhibition on catastrophe.If you've read my stuff you'll know I think catastrophe is better than disaster (they're different!) and at the very least we should turn global warming into a catastrophe (there are witnesses) not a disaster (no witnesses).Anyway, the exhibition closes with a chance to write... Ecology Without Nature -


Yoko Ono in Being Ecological Have you ever read Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind, by Shunryu Suzuki?If you haven't do so at once lol...it gives you the best best best mediation instruction, no matter what contemplative lineage you're in (or not).And somewhere in the middle is the most wonderful mysterious thing: two blank pages, with a life-size drawing of a fly on the upper right hand corner of the double-page spread.That's the moment of mind transmission right there! I'm not spoiling... Ecology Without Nature -


Graham Harman's New Book I continue to count my OOO blessings! My life started to go so right when Levi Bryant pointed out that my “strange stranger” (the term I use for lifeforms in The Ecological Thought) was identical to what OOO means by “object.” Here's what I wrote on the back of Graham's latest tome:An essential guide by the foremost philosopher of our age. This book will educate and delight both aficionados and those unfamiliar with the first... Ecology Without Nature -


Tokyo This Week I so had the best time! Thank you thank you to the organizers of the lovely Innovative City Forum. I met amazing people, and thanks to the beautifully organized format, real thinking and relating was possible. Ecology Without Nature -


Tristan Garcia's The Life Intense Do you have a copy yet? It's awesome. Here's what I wrote about it:Tristan Garcia demonstrates how at the most encompassing level of contemporary social roles lives the Romantic consumerist, forever seeking spiritually heightened experiences: what he like Pater calls intensity. We’re all Baudelaires now. Ecological ethics and politics ignores this at its peril: all that talk of efficiency and anti-consumerism seems to want to bypass this inconvenient truth. An ecological future must voyage through... Ecology Without Nature -


MEMORIES I just watched the third in my series of video lectures on Ideological Critique as a refresher for a forthcoming lecture on Mannheim in my Columbia course.  I watched my discourse on Mannheim’s ideological analysis of time consciousness, and then my attempt at an extension of it to the case of  space consciousness.  I wrap that up with an ideological analysis of the revolutionary orientation toward space, which concludes with my story about a Columbia... The Philosopher’s Stone -


Episode #47 - Eubanks on Automating Inequality  In this episode I talk to Virginia Eubanks. Virginia is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany, SUNY. She is the author of several books, including Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor and Digital Dead End: Fighting for Social Justice in the Information Age. Her writing about technology and social justice has appeared in The American Prospect, The Nation, Harper’s and Wired. She has worked for... Philosophical Disquisitions -


Materiality revisited I’ve long been puzzled by materiality. Here’s a thought: What if materiality isn’t characterized by anything deeply metaphysical, but by a physical quality? Perhaps to be material just is to have something like inertia, or mass, or energy? (I think that to have zero of some quality like mass is still to have mass. A mass of x is a determinate of the determinable mass even if x = 0. Photons have mass, while numbers don’t.) Alexander Pruss -


Accommodation, Inference, Generics and Pejoratives Abstract: In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and inference. This connection goes some way to explain why generics exhibit some very strange behaviour: Why is it, for example, that “birds lay eggs” seems true, while “birds are female” seems false, despite the fact... Consequently.org -


Accommodation, Inference, Generics and Pejoratives Abstract: In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and inference. This connection goes some way to explain why generics exhibit some very strange behaviour: Why is it, for example, that “birds lay eggs” seems true, while “birds are female” seems false, despite the fact... Consequently.org -


Proof Theory, Rules and Meaning — an introduction Abstract: I introduce the key themes from my book-in-progress, Proof Theory, Rules and Meaning. This is a talk for the symposium on the manuscript held at the Argentinean Society of Philosophical Analysis (SADAF) in Buenos Aires, in July 2018. The slides for the talk are available here. Consequently.org -


Defining Rules, Proofs and Counterexamples Abstract: In this talk, I will present an account of defining rules, with the aim of explaining these rules they play a central role in analytic proofs. Along the way, I’ll explain how Kreisel’s squeezing argument helps us understand the connection between an informal notion of validity and the notions formalised in our accounts of proofs and models, and the relationship between proof-theoretic and model- theoretic analyses of logical consequence. This is a talk for... Consequently.org -


Truth Tellers in Bradwardine's Theory of Truth Stephen Read’s work on Bradwardine’s theory of truth is some of the most exciting work on truth and insolubilia in recent years. Read brings together modern tools of formal logic and Bradwardine’s theory of signification to show that medieval distinctions can give great insight into the behaviour of semantic concepts such as truth. In a number of papers, I have developed a model theory for Bradwardine’s account of truth. This model theory has distinctive features:... Consequently.org -


Isomorphisms in a Category of Propositions and Proofs Abstract: In this talk, I show how a category of propositions and classical proofs can give rise to three different hyperintensional notions of sameness of content. One of these notions is very fine-grained, going so far as to distinguish \(p\) and \(p\land p\), while identifying other distinct pairs of formulas, such as \(p\land q\) and \(q\land p\); \(p\) and \(\neg\neg p\); or \(\neg(p\land q)\) and \(\neg p\lor\neg q\). Another relation is more coarsely grained, and... Consequently.org -


Accommodation, Inference, Generics and Pejoratives Abstract: In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and inference. This connection goes some way to explain why generics exhibit some very strange behaviour: Why is it, for example, that “birds lay eggs” seems true, while “birds are female” seems false, despite the fact... Consequently.org -


Accommodation, Inference, Generics and Pejoratives Abstract: In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and inference. This connection goes some way to explain why generics exhibit some very strange behaviour: Why is it, for example, that “birds lay eggs” seems true, while “birds are female” seems false, despite the fact... Consequently.org -


Isomorphisms in a Category of Proofs Abstract: In this talk, I show how a category of classical proofs can give rise to three different hyperintensional notions of sameness of content. One of these notions is very fine-grained, going so far as to distinguish \(p\) and \(p\land p\), while identifying other distinct pairs of formulas, such as \(p\land q\) and \(q\land p\); \(p\) and \(\neg\neg p\); or \(\neg(p\land q)\) and \(\neg p\lor\neg q\). Another relation is more coarsely grained, and gives the... Consequently.org -


Isomorphisms in a Category of Proofs Abstract: In this talk, I show how a category of formulas and classical proofs can give rise to three different hyperintensional notions of sameness of content. One of these notions is very fine-grained, going so far as to distinguish \(p\) and \(p\land p\), while identifying other distinct pairs of formulas, such as \(p\land q\) and \(q\land p\); \(p\) and \(\neg\neg p\); or \(\neg(p\land q)\) and \(\neg p\lor\neg q\). Another relation is more coarsely grained, and... Consequently.org -


Accommodation, Inference, Generics and Pejoratives Abstract: In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and inference. This connection goes some way to explain why generics exhibit some very strange behaviour: Why is it, for example, that “birds lay eggs” seems true, while “birds are female” seems false, despite the fact... Consequently.org -