Science & Logic

Updating by minimizing expected inaccuracy

One of the central questions of Bayesian epistemology concerns how you should update your credences in response to new evidence you obtain. The proposal I want to discuss here belongs to an approach that consists of two steps. First, we specify the constraints that your evidence places on your posterior credences. Second, we specify a means by which to survey the credence functions that satisfy those constraints and pick one to adopt as your posterior.For instance, in the first step, we might say that when we learn a proposition $E$, we must become certain of it, and so it imposes the following constraint on our posterior credence function $Q$: $Q(E) = 1$. Or we might consider the sort of situation Richard Jeffrey discussed, where there is a partition $E_1, \ldots, E_m$ and credences $q_1, \ldots, q_m$ with $q_1 + \ldots + q_m = 1$ such that your evidence imposes the constraint: $Q(E_i) = q_i$, for $i = 1, \ldots, m$. Or the situation van Fraassen discussed, where your evidence constrains your posterior conditional credences, so that there is a credence $q$ and propositions $A$ and $B$ such that your evidence imposes the constraint: $Q(A|B) = q$.In the second step of the approach, on the other hand, we might following objective Bayesians like Jon Williamson, Alena Vencovská, and Jeff Paris and say that, from among those credence functions that respect your evidence, you should pick the one that, on a natural measure of informational content, contains minimal information, and which thus... -

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Visualizing the Connections among Philosophical Topics

Justin Reppert, a philosophy Ph.D. student at Fordham University, has created a fun tool that illustrates the connections between various philosophical topics, based on the “related links” sections of articles at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ¶ “Philosophical Graphiti” charts the shortest paths of such links between two topics.... -

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THE FATE OF ANALYSIS, #16–Naming Objects or Things, and Picturing Atomic Facts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction                                                                                                 II. Classical Analytic Philosophy                                                                II.1 What Classical Analytic Philosophy Is: Two Basic Theses                                           II.2 What Classical Analytic Philosophy Officially Isn’t: Its Conflicted Anti-Kantianism              II.3 Classical Analytic Philosophy Characterized in Simple, Subtler, and Subtlest Ways II.4 Three Kinds of Analysis: Decompositional, Transformative, and... -

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THE FATE OF ANALYSIS, #16–Naming Objects or Things, and Picturing Atomic Facts. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction                                                                                                 II. Classical Analytic Philosophy                                                                II.1 What Classical Analytic Philosophy Is: Two Basic Theses                                           II.2 What Classical Analytic Philosophy Officially Isn’t: Its Conflicted Anti-Kantianism              II.3 Classical Analytic Philosophy Characterized in Simple, Subtler, and Subtlest Ways II.4 Three Kinds of Analysis: Decompositional, Transformative, and Conceptual                 II.5 Frege, The First … [continue reading] Against Professional Philosophy -


Visualizing the Connections among Philosophical Topics Justin Reppert, a philosophy Ph.D. student at Fordham University, has created a fun tool that illustrates the connections between various philosophical topics, based on the “related links” sections of articles at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Philosophical Graphiti” charts the shortest paths of such links between two topics. Enter in two topics (as you begin to type suggestions to choose from show up in a window), and the result is a constellation of connections. For example,... Daily Nous -


On Inferring Mechanisms In Cognitive Science One of the things that cognitive scientists do is look for, identify, and describe mechanisms. For example, cognitive scientists are interested in our ability (or proclivity) to ascribe mental states to others things and creatures. So, some posit a “theory of mind” mechanism. But, intuitively, there will not be a mechanism for every one of our abilities … Continue reading On Inferring Mechanisms In Cognitive Science Via Nick Byrd - Fellow and Assistant Professor (to be) tudying... Nick Byrd -


5 Thoughts About “Liberal Hypocrites” Must liberals tolerate everything? Are they hypocrites if they don't? No. Of course not. In case that's not obvious, here are five things to think about.  Via Nick Byrd - Fellow and Assistant Professor (to be) tudying cognitive science of philosophy (and philosophy of cognitive science). Nick Byrd -


Why Critical Reasoning Might Not Require Self-knowledge Tyler Burge famously argued that critical reasoning entails self-knowledge. Here I explain Burge's argument and my concerns about it. Via Nick Byrd - Fellow and Assistant Professor (to be) tudying cognitive science of philosophy (and philosophy of cognitive science). Nick Byrd -


Game Mechanics vs Player Practices Earlier this week, I waded in on an interesting discussion that broke out on Twitter about the use of the terms 'game mechanics' and 'game systems', definitely worth a read if you're into discussions around game terminology or have an interest in the history of game design. Here's an extract: And that's where and why it all goes wrong for everyone trying to 'fix' game mechanic as a term. Because both 'game mechanic' and 'game... Only a Game -


Updating by minimizing expected inaccuracy One of the central questions of Bayesian epistemology concerns how you should update your credences in response to new evidence you obtain. The proposal I want to discuss here belongs to an approach that consists of two steps. First, we specify the constraints that your evidence places on your posterior credences. Second, we specify a means by which to survey the credence functions that satisfy those constraints and pick one to adopt as your posterior.For... M-Phi -


What if We Could Have Meat Without Murder? We can, if we can agree that it doesn’t need to come from the body of an animal. The Stone -


“Realism With a Straight Face: A Response to Leonard Lawlor” That’s the title of my chapter in a new collection from Bloomsbury, edited by Gregor Kroupka, and readable free of charge online or as downloadable PDFs. HERE. Object Oriented Philosophy -


Dislocating the self: The self is not in the brain, or the mind Shaun Gallagher for The Institute of Art and Ideas. consciousnessEmbodied cognitionExternalismpersonal identityShaun Gallaghersituated cognition Man Without Qualities -


Physicalism Deconstructed: Levels of Reality and the Mind–Body Problem 2020.06.31 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Kevin Morris, Physicalism Deconstructed: Levels of Reality and the Mind–Body Problem, Cambridge University Press, 2019, 265pp., $84.00, ISBN 9781108472166. Reviewed by Jessica M. Wilson, University of Toronto Physicalism, generally characterized, is the view that physical goings-on, typically in massively complex combination, constitute a complete metaphysical basis for all the world’s goings-on. This characterization takes many specific forms. Popular of late is non-reductive physicalism (NRP),... Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews -


Pluralism in public life Consider this formulation of the central problem of a pluralist democracy: How to have a democracy where there is a broad plurality of sets of values? Assuming realism about the correct set of values, this is roughly equivalent to: How to have a democracy where most people are wrong in different ways about the values? But when we think about (1) and (2), we are led to thinking about the problem in different ways. Formulation... Alexander Pruss -


Oakeshottian Modes at the Crossroads of the Evolution Debates Zygon: Volume44, Issue1, March 2009, pp. 197-222 Christopher Hitchenscorey abelexperience and its modesMichael OakeshottRichard Dawkinsscience and religionStephen Jay Gould Man Without Qualities -


“A Moral Case for Universal Basic Income” Philosopher Matt Zwolinski weighs in here. What's Wrong? -


Publication day! With thanks to the estimable Tom Gauld You can get IFL2 from CUP directly: or, even better, support your local friendly indie bookshop! The post Publication day! appeared first on Logic Matters. Logic Matters -


“Tolerando el paralaje arquitectónico” I had no idea there would be a Spanish translation of my article “Tolerating Architectural Parallax” from a few years ago, but HERE IT IS. Object Oriented Philosophy -


Two attempts at deriving internal time from the causal order of modes It would be nice to define the internal time of a substance in terms of the causal order of its accidents. For each mode (i.e., accident or substantial form) α that a finite substance x has, there is the event cα of α’s being caused. Causal priority provides a strict partial ordering on the events cα. Perhaps the simplest theory of the internal time of the substance x is that the moments of internal time... Alexander Pruss -


THE FATE OF ANALYSIS, #15–What is a Tractarian Proposition? TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction                                                                                                 II. Classical Analytic Philosophy                                                                II.1 What Classical Analytic Philosophy Is: Two Basic Theses                                           II.2 What Classical Analytic Philosophy Officially Isn’t: Its Conflicted Anti-Kantianism              II.3 Classical Analytic Philosophy Characterized in Simple, Subtler, and Subtlest Ways II.4 Three Kinds of Analysis: Decompositional, Transformative, and Conceptual                 II.5 Frege, The First … [continue reading] Against Professional Philosophy -


The representational, propositional and conceptual dimension of infant belief attribution capacity There are good reasons to suppose that the infant’s innate disposition for informational sensitivity is grounded on a representational mind. As Kim Sterelny (1991, p. 21) writes: «there can be no informational sensitivity without representation. To learn about the world and to use what we learn to act in new ways, we must be able to represent the world […]. Furthermore, we must make appropriate inferences from those representations». Representations must be inferentially linked to... Brains Blog -


Singular Thought and Mental Files 2020.06.21 : View this Review Online | View Recent NDPR Reviews Rachel Goodman, James Genone, and Nick Kroll (eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files, Oxford University Press, 2020, 268pp., $70.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198746881. Reviewed by Michele Palmira, Complutense University of Madrid Upon attending perceptually to a chair in front of me I think a thought I would express by saying: 'That is blue'. Philosophers of mind have dubbed this kind of thought singular. What's the... Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews -